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Discovery by the Prosecution in Criminal
Cases: Prudhomme Reconsidered
JON R. ROLEFSON*
On April 1, 1970, the California Supreme Court dealt a stun-
ning blow to the prosecution of criminal cases when it rendered
its decision in Prudhomme v. Superior Court.1 In an opinion
authored by Justice Burke, the court there held that the prosecu-
tion in a criminal case is prohibited from obtaining information
from the defense when "disclosure thereof conceivably might
lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief."'2
The announcement of this rule marked a dramatic turnabout in
the development of an important aspect of the law of criminal
discovery in California. The result has been that, while the scope
of permissible discovery by the defense has been expanding by
leaps and bounds, the establishment of definitive and equitable
guidelines for prosecution discovery has been effectively
* The author is a member of the California State Bar; Deputy District
Attorney; Alameda County District Attorney; received a B.A. from the Univer-
sity of California Berkley (1970), and a J.D. from Hastings College of Law (1973);
Thurston Honor Society; Order of the Coif upon graduation.
1. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
2. Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
stymied. In order to appreciate the impact that Prudhomme has
had and the problems it has created, the case must be reviewed
within the context of the development of the law relative to
criminal discovery both before and after it was decided.
Criminal Discovery Before Prudhomme:
At common law a defendant in a criminal case could not
compel discovery of evidence in the possession of the prosecu-
tion.3 The rationale for this rule was said to be that the defendant
might otherwise be more able to fabricate a defense to meet the
state's case, and would thereby gain an undue advantage.4 This
attitude persisted in California, where a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme existed for discovery in civil cases,' though virtually
none was available in criminal cases.6
People v. Riser,7 decided in 1956, was the first California case
to deal squarely with this rule. There, following cross-
examination of two prosecution witnesses during trial, the de-
fense issued a subpoena duces tecum directing the sheriff to
produce their prior written statements for possible impeach-
ment. The prosecution successfully moved for an order vacating
the subpoena. In holding that the trial court's order was errone-
ous, the California Supreme Court reasoned that the rationale
behind the common law rule had no application to discovery by
the defense during trial.8 The court then went on to lay the
groundwork for liberalization of criminal discovery by the de-
fense stating:
Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept
confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state
has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can
throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in
convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigor-
ously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence
permits. To deny flatly any right of production on the ground that an
imbalance would be created between the advantages of prosecution
3. See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 475-76 (3rd ed. 1940); People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d
566, 585, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956).
4. Id.
5. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 2016 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
6. "[Ilt has long been held that civil discovery procedure has no relevance to
criminal prosecutions." Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 536, 522 P.2d
305, 308, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1974).
The only exception was found in California Penal Code § 925, which requires
that a defendant be provided with a transcript of grand jury proceedings.
However, effective January 1, 1976, §§ 859 and 1430 require the prosecuting
attorney to make available to a defendant copies of "police, arrest and crime
reports".
7. 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
8. Id. at 585, 305 P.2d at 13.
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and defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal trial,
the ascertainment of the facts.
9
The stage having been set in Riser, the Supreme Court pro-
ceeded six months later in Powell v. Superior Court10 to tackle
the question whether a defendant may compel discovery before
trial. Powell involved a pretrial motion by the defendant for an
order authorizing him to inspect written and tape recorded state-
ments he had made to the police following his arrest. Noting the
absence of enabling legislation, Powell held that such an appli-
cation is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
court, which has inherent power to order such an inspection in
the interest of justice." In directing the trial court to grant
defendant's motion, the court observed that to deny pretrial
discovery "partakes of the nature of a game, rather than judicial
procedure.' 1 2 Moreover, it
would be out of harmony with the policy of this state that the goal of
criminal prosecutions is not to secure a conviction in every case by any
expedient means, however odious, but rather, only through establish-
ing the truth upon a public trial fair to defendant and the state alike.13
In the wake of Riser and Powell came a rush of California
cases which undertook to define the standards 4 and expand the
scope' 5 of criminal discovery. During the five-year period im-
mediately following Powell, however, these cases dealt only with
defense requests for discovery.
In 1962, the California Supreme Court considered for the first
9. Id. at 586, 305 P.2d at 13 (citations omitted).
10. 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
11. Id. at 708, 312 P.2d at 700.
12. Id. at 709, 312 P.2d at 701. (Quoting from State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319,296
S.W. 132, 135 [1927]).
13. Id. at 707, 312 P.2d at 699-700.
14. E.g., People v. Terry, 57 Cal. 2d 538,370 P.2d 985, 21 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1962);
People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 355 P.2d 641, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1960); People v.
Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 964, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1960); Funk v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959); People v. Chapman, 53 Cal. 2d 95, 338
P.2d 428 (1959); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959); Tupper v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 263, 331 P.2d 977 (1958).
15. E.g., Cash v. Superior CQurt, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959) (tape
recordings made by an undercover police officer during the alleged offense);
Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92,330 P.2d 773 (1958) (taped statement of the
victim played to the defendant at the time he was interrogated by police); Norton
v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133,343 P.2d 139 (1959) (names and addresses
of eyewitnesses to the offense and photographs of defendant shown to them for
identification); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134,317 P.2d 130 (1957)
(reports of laboratory analysis of physical evidence).
time the question of pretrial discovery by the prosecution. In
Jones v. Superior Court,16 the defendant was charged with rape.
His defense was that he was impotent as the result of injuries
suffered years earlier. Following a successful pretrial motion by
the prosecution for discovery relating to that defense, the de-
fendant petitioned for a writ of prohibition restraining enforce-
ment of the trial court's order.
The Supreme Court upheld the order insofar as it required
disclosure of witnesses defendant intended to call and reports
and X-rays he intended to introduce in evidence at trial. In the
opinion he wrote for the majority, Justice Traynor initially noted
that: "[d]iscovery is designed to ascertain the truth. . . in crimi-
nal as well as in civil cases. ' ' 17 He then pointed out that the
considerations leading the Riser court to order defense discov-
ery are equally applicable in the case of prosecution discovery:
.. .Similarly, absent the privilege against self-crimination [sic] or
other privileges provided by law, the defendant in a criminal case has
no valid interest in denying the prosecution access to evidence that can
throw light on issues in the case. Nor is it any less appropriate in one
case than in the other for the courts to develop the rules governing
discovery in the absence of express legislation authorizing such
discovery.
* . .That procedure should not be a one-way street.
18
In response to the contention that such an order violates both
the privilege against self-incrimination 19 and the attorney client
privilege,20 Justice Traynor observed that a number of states
have statutes providing for discovery in criminal cases of the
identity of witnesses who are to be called to testify in connection
with a particular defense, such as alibi, which had been uniform-
ly upheld.21 As his opinion points out:
• ..The identity of the defense witnesses and the existence of any
reports or x-rays the defense offers in evidence will necessarily be
revealed at the trial. The witnesses will be subject to cross-
examination, and the reports and X-rays subject to study and chal-
lenge. Learning the identity of the defense witnesses and of such
reports and X-rays in advance merely enables the prosecution to per-
form its function at the trial more effectively....
16. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
17. Id. at 58, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
18. Id. at 59-60, 372 P.2d at 920-21, 22 Cal. Rptr. 881.
19. CAL. CONST., art. I, § 15 (formerly CAL. CONST., art. I, § 13); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 688; CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 930, 940 (West 1970) (formerly CAL. PENAL CODE §
1323.5).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution was not held applicable
to the states until after the Jones decision, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1970) (formerly CAL. CODE OF CIv. PRO. § 1881,
subd. 2).
21. 58 Cal. 2d at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (cases cited).
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Insofar as the trial court's order herein requires petitioner to reveal
the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to call and to produce
reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence to support his
defense of impotence, it does not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination. Nor to this extent does it violate the attorney-client
privilege. It simply requires petitioner to disclose information that he
will shortly reveal anyway. Such information is discoverable .... 22
Following Jones, and upon its authority, a number of court of
appeal decisions upheld discovery orders in favor of the prosecu-
tion in criminal cases. These cases all dealt with so-called "af-
firmative defenses," reflecting a widespread interpretation of
Jones as being so limited. In People v. Dugas,23 a pretrial order
for disclosure of witnesses defendant intended to call "in any
affirmative defense" was held proper.24 In McGuire v. Superior
Court,5 the discovery order related to the "affirmative defense
of diminished capacity."
But in 1969, the Supreme Court, in People v. Pike,2 6 upheld an
order requiring the defendant to disclose names, addresses and
expected testimony of defense witnesses, without regard for the
nature of the defense. This led one appellate court, in Ruiz v.
Superior Court,27 to comment: "In a recent decision (People v.
Pike,. . .) our Supreme Court makes clear that it does not view
Jones as being limited to affirmative defenses. ' 28 Accordingly,
Ruiz held proper a discovery order insofar as it directed defend-
ant to reveal "the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to
call, and written material he intends to offer in evidence...
The foregoing outline demonstrates that discovery in criminal
cases was judicially created, not under statutory or constitution-
al compulsion,30 but rather to promote the orderly and efficient
22. Id. at 61-62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
23. 242 Cal. App. 2d 244, 51 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966).
24. In compliance with the order, the defendant in Dugas disclosed the name
of an alibi witness.
25. 274 Cal. App. 2d 583, 79 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1969).
26. 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969).
27. 275 Cal. App. 2d 633, 80 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1969).
28. Id. at 634, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
29. Id. at 636, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 524. The Supreme Court denied Ruiz' applica-
tion for a hearing on October 22, 1969.
30. "Pretrial discovery in favor of defendants ... is not required by due
process." Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59,372 P.2d 919,921,22 Cal. Rptr.
879, 881 (1962). But cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). People v. Ruthford,
ascertainment of the truth. Toward that end, there was no reason
why the procedure should not be made equally available to the
defense and the prosecution, limited only by statutory and con-
stitutional protections. The resulting rules of discovery prior to
Prudhomme may be generally stated as follows: subject to a
proper showing,3 a defendant could obtain before trial informa-
tion in possession of the state, whether or not the prosecution
intended to introduce it at trial; the prosecution could obtain
information from the defendant which he intended to introduce
at trial.
The Prudhomme Decision
In Prudhomme, the defendant petitioned for a writ of prohibi-
tion against enforcement of a pretrial order that she disclose to
the prosecution the names, addresses and expected testimony of
the witnesses she intended to call at trial. The supreme court
granted the writ.
In his majority opinion, Justice Burke first had to deal with the
Jones and Pike decisions. He did so in brief fashion, merely
declaring that neither case was intended to stand for the broad
proposition that all defense witnesses were subject to pretrial
disclosure. 32 After paying lip service to the judicial considera-
tions underlying the Jones decision,33 he next observed that:
. . . certain signficiant developments in the law since Jones was
decided in 1962 caution us not to extend its holding beyond its facts
without careful consideration of the possible effects which such an
extension could have upon the accused's rights and privileges, and
especially his fundamental right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
34
These "significant developments" were:
(1) The United States Supreme Court had been placing increas-
ing emphasis on the role played by the fifth amendment privilege
14 Cal. 3d 399,534 P.2d 1341,121 Cal. Rptr. 261(1975); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525,
487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971).
31. "Although the defendant does not have to show, and indeed may be
unable to show, that the evidence which he seeks to have produced would be
admissible at the trial [citations] he does have to show some better cause for
inspection than a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been
obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime." People v. Cooper, 53
Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1960).
32. 2 Cal. 3d at 323, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31 (1970).
33. "We readily acknowledge that pretrial disclosure would greatly facilitate
the administration of criminal justice by minimizing the element of surprise,
avoiding unnecessary delays and continuances, reducing inconvenience to the
court, counsel, jurors and witnesses, and permitting more effective pretrial
preparation." Id. at 323, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
34. Id. (Footnote omitted).
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against self-incrimination, 35 which had been held applicable to
the states.36
(2) Pursuant to its rulemaking power, the United States Su-
preme Court had promulgated in 1966 the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which make limited provision for disclo-
sure of physical evidence the defense intends to introduce at
trial, but none for disclosure of defense witnesses.37
(3) The constitutionality of the state "alibi statutes" relied upon
in Jones was doubtful. A federal district court in Cantillion v.
Superior Court38 had recently granted habeas corpus to annul a
discovery order requiring a defendant to disclose alibi witnesses
he intended to call. Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court had granted certiorari in Williams v. Florida,9 a case
which had upheld Florida's alibi statute against fifth amend-
ment attack.
Finally, Justice Burke quoted from the recent language of
People v. Schader:40
• ..Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally com-
pelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured,
and may not by coercion prove a charge against the accused out of his
own mouth. [Citations] The People must 'shoulder the entire load' of
their burden of proof in their case in chief, without assistance either
from the defendant's silence or from his compelled testimony.
He reasoned that analysis of Jones in light of the "policy consid-
erations" discussed in Schader makes it apparent that the availa-
bility of discovery to the prosecution should not depend upon
whether the information sought relates to an "affirmative de-
fense," or upon whether the defendant intends to introduce it at
trial, but rather depends upon "whether disclosure thereof con-
ceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its
case in chief." This rule, he said, "forbids compelled disclosures
35. U.S. CONST. Amend. V., see, e.g.: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
36. Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); U.S. CONST., Amend V.
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (c). Justice Burke apparently viewed this as an
expression of the United States Supreme Court's position on the extent to which
the privilege against self-incrimination limits prosecution discovery. However,
he noted that even the limited prosecution discovery provided for in the Federal
Rules is subject to constitutional question.
38. 305 F. Supp. 304 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
39. 224 So. 2d 406 (1969), aff'd 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
40. 71 Cal. 2d 761, 770, 457 P.2d 841, 845-46, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1969).
which could serve as a 'link in a chain' of evidence tending to
establish guilt .... "41
Having thus created confusion, Justice Burke proceeded into
chaos when he interjected: "We do not intend to suggest that the
prosecution should be barred from any discovery in this, or any
other, case. '42 With that closing thought, he left the lower Calif or-
nia courts to struggle with the riddle of Prudhomme: What, if
anything, is discoverable by the prosecution?
Prosecution Discovery After Prudhomme
People v. Griffin,43 reported shortly after Prudhomme, consid-
ered the question of discovery by the prosecution. There, the
defendant was charged with murder. His defense was that of
diminished capacity due to intoxication.
Before trial and upon the prosecution's motion, the court or-
dered defendant to disclose the names, addresses and statements
of any witnesses he intended to call in support of "his affirmative
defenses." Without any underlying discussion, the court of ap-
peal declared the order void, citing Prudhomme. In doing so, the
court appeared to interpret the Supreme Court's decision as
establishing a flat rule of prohibition against any pretrial pros-
ecution discovery. The same court later had the opportunity to
explain its holding in Griffin v. Superior Court.44 However, the
court continued to reflect the confusion engendered by the lan-
guage of Prudhomme when it stated:
Thus the [prosecution] would have been entitled to the names and
addresses of witnesses who meet the criteria of Prudhomme, assuming
any do, if their identity had been ascertained upon proper notice and
after a hearing at which the defendant was given the right to show that
the disclosure of the information could incriminate him.
45
The next reported case dealing with prosecution discovery,
People v. Bais,46 demonstrated how unsatisfactory guidelines
41. 2 Cal. 3d at 326,466 P.2d at 677,85 Cal. Rptr. at 133. As examples, Justice
Burke noted situations where disclosure of a defense witness could provide the
prosecution with its sole eyewitness to the offense.
42. Id. at 327,466 P.2d at 678,85 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Significantly, Prudhomme
did not overrule Jones. It did, however, expressly disapprove Pike, Ruiz,
McGuire and Dugas to the extent that they were inconsistent with the views
expressed in Prudhomme. (Id., n.11).
43. 18 Cal. App. 3d 864, 96 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1971).
44. 26 Cal. App. 3d 672, 103 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1972). Following reversal of the
defendant's conviction in People v. Griffin, the case was remanded to the trial
court. Before retrial, defendant moved for an order prohibiting the prosecution
from calling any witnesses whose identities had been disclosed pursuant to the
"void" discovery order in the first trial. When his motion was denied, he
petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief by way of writ.
45. Id. at 686, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (Emphasis added.).
46. 31 Cal. App. 3d 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1973).
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produce unsatisfactory results. In Bais, the defendant was
charged with robbery. After the prosecution had rested, the
defense called four alibi witnesses. Before cross-examining the
second alibi witness called, the prosecutor moved to discover any
written statements in possession of the defense made by each of
the four witnesses.47 Over objection, the trial court ordered de-
fense counsel to deliver to the prosecutor any statements made
by the two alibi witnesses already called, and thereafter the
statements of any other alibi witnesses as and when they were
called. The defense complied with the order but, following con-
viction, appealed.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the discovery order
was improper under Prudhomme. It noted that no steps were
taken by the trial court to assure that the contents of the state-
ments could not possibly "lighten the prosecution's burden of
proving its case in chief." In response to the argument that the
prosecution had already rested, the court pointed out that it
could have been permitted to reopen its "case in chief," 48 or could
have commenced a new "case in chief" in the event of a retrial.49
But the court did not stop there in expanding its interpretation of
Prudhomme. Astonishingly, it attributed the broadest conceiv-
able scope to the decision when it declared:
It follows that prosecution discovery must be denied, regardless, of
when requested, if the trial court determines that the matters to be
disclosed will conceivably "lighten" the "burden" which the prosecu-
tion bears in bringing about a conviction of the accused. "Negating an
alibi defense" may very well produce this result, irrespective of the fact
that it would be done through the medium of rebuttal evidence .... 50
The court having "picked up the ball" of Prudhomme and
47. The right of a criminal defendant to discover written statements of
prosecution witnesses who testify has long been recognized. No foundational
showing is required, due to the inherent value of such statements for use in
possible impeachment. (See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 355 P.2d 641,7
Cal. Rptr. 897 [1960]. It goes without saying that defense witnesses' statements
may be equally valuable to the prosecution.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(4) (West 1970).
49. This same reasoning would prevent a pitcher from throwing his surprise
pitch in the seventh game of the World Series, because the other teams would be
ready for it next season.
50. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26. (Emphasis by the court.)
Curiously, the court injected by way of footnote the non-sequitur that, by holding
such discovery unconstitutional in absence of statutory authorization, it did not
mean to suggest that it would be improper if ordered in compliance with a
constitutional statute.
literally run away with it, thus set the scene for a conflict between
the courts of appeal as they attempted to apply the new rule.
Such a conflict arose quickly.
In People v. Chavez,5 1 the prosecutor, during his cross-
examination of each of five defense witnesses had been allowed
to discover statements made by the witnesses to a Public De-
fender investigator.5 2 Thereafter, the prosecutor called the inves-
tigator in rebuttal to impeach three of those witnesses with the
statements thus discovered. The appellate court held the orders
granting prosecution discovery to have been error, but further
held that the error was harmless under the particular facts of the
case. However, the rationale for this decision was in direct con-
flict with the language of Bais:
• . . [W]e perceive that under our adversary system in the conduct of
trials the prosecutor would have been entitled to discover whether the
statements contained any matter that would serve to impeach the
witness's testimony at the trial. This conclusion necessarily follows
because the witness by his appearance on the stand vouches for his
testimony then given and thus subjects it to the proper scrutiny of
cross-examination and its concomitant right to the presentation of
available matter of impeachment in the ascertainment of the truth.
The procedural defect in the instant case was the trial court's failure
to examine the statements in order to determine whether they con-
tained any impeaching matter and if they did, to effectively separate
such matter from other non-impeaching collateral matter which might
be of assistance to the prosecution in proving its case and thus lighten
its prosecutional burden.
53
The next reported 54 decision by a court of appeal dealing with
prosecution discovery was People v. Ayers.55 In Ayers, at the
close of the People's case, the prosecution moved to discover
statements of any defense witnesses for possible use as impeach-
ment. The trial court ordered defense counsel to deliver any such
statements to the court, indicating they would be screened and
only those portions having a bearing on credibility would be
51. 33 Cal. App. 3d 454, 109 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1973).
52. Statements made by independent witnesses to an investigator are not
confidential communications between a client and his attorney. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 952 (West 1970); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355,364 P.2d 266,
15 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1961). Nor are they protected by the "work-product" privilege.
CAL. CODE OF CIv. PRO. § 2016(b) (West 1970); see Kadelbach v. Amaral, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 814, 107 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1973).
53. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 459, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
54. People v. Cox (Crim. No. 22284) was decided by Division Five of the
Second District Court of Appeal on June 27, 1974, and was originally reported in
the official advance sheets at 40 Cal. App. 3d 259. In a lengthy discussion, the
court there distinguished Prudhomme and Bais from Chavez, and adopted the
rationale of the latter. However, on August 21, 1974, the Supreme Court directed
that the opinion not be published in the official reports (CAL. RULES OF COURT
976(c)).
55. 51 Cal. App. 3d 370, 124 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1975).
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turned over to the prosecution. The statement of one defense
witness was disclosed pursuant to that order. On appeal, the
discovery procedure was held proper,56 the court noting that
nothing turned over to the prosecution was "incriminatory."
While a few courts have appeared to be fashioning some work-
able (albeit restricted) guidelines for permissible prosecution
discovery during trial, a general state of confusion has continued
to prevail concerning the propriety and scope of pretrial discov-
ery." This is pointed out by the most recent decision on the
subject, Craig v. Superior Court.5 8 In that case, the defendant
filed a pretrial motion for discovery of statements made to any
inspector or attorney of the district attorney's office by any
witness who would be called by the prosecution at trial.59 The
trial court granted the motion, but conditioned its order upon
reciprocal disclosure to the prosecution of any statements made
to defense representatives by those same witnesses .6 0 On defend-
ant's petition, the court of appeal issued a writ of mandate
requiring the trial court to vacate its order for prosecution
discovery.
However, Craig was decided by a divided court. The fact that
separate opinions were filed by each of the three justices em-
56. The opinion cited neither Bais nor Chavez, but implicitly approved the
procedure outlined in the latter case.
57. Also decided in 1975 was Allen v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 729
(hearing granted), which added a "new twist" to rules regarding compelled
disclosure by the defense. There, the trial court ordered the prosecution and the
defense to furnish the names of prospective witnesses before jury selection. The
intent was to read the names to the prospective jurors to ascertain whether any of
the witnesses were known by them. The order enjoined the prosecution from
contacting any named defense witnesses until disclosure during trial by the
defense in an opening statement or otherwise. On petition for writ of prohibition,
the Court of Appeal held the order proper, stating that the remote possibility of
the prosecution's burden being lightened thereby should yield to the necessity of
securing a fair and impartial jury. However, the Supreme Court granted a
hearing in the case on December 30, 1975. The Court of Appeal opinion is
therefore not to be published in the official reports and is without effect. CAL.
RULES OF COURT 976(d), 977.
58. 54 Cal. App. 3d 416, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1976).
59. The fact the witnesses in question were those to be called at trial by the
prosecution is not clearly reflected in the opinion. Review of the records of the
Superior Court of Alameda County in People v. Mario Craig (No. 59464) shows
this to be the case.
60. The Court of Appeal held it improper to impose a condition upon a
defendant's otherwise-established right to discovery. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 420, 126
Cal. Rptr. at 566.
phasizes the confusion over the meaning and scope of Prudhom-
me. That each justice took a different approach in applying
Prudhomme to the discovery order demonstrates its inadequacy.
In his opinion, Presiding Justice Molinari observed without
further analysis that it did not clearly appear on the face of the
trial court's order or records that the statement ordered to be
produced could not possibly be incriminatory. 61 He did not con-
sider the order in the context of the particular facts of the case,
however. In contrast, Justice Sims pointed out in his dissent that
the order did not compel disclosure of any information that was
not already available to the prosecution, since the witnesses had
already been interviewed and could be reinterviewed. He
reasoned, therefore, the order could not possibly lighten the
prosecution's burden.62 But it is the concurring opinion of Justice
Elkington which is most revealing:
... Prudhomme, although stating that in some situations discovery
is available to the People, nevertheless appears to foreclose it in all
cases; for it is the essential nature of the People's discovery that it will
"lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief".
63
Considering himself thus "bound, but not gagged, ' 4 Justice
Elkington took the opportunity to criticize the Supreme Court's
decision, stating that "reason, fairness and most of all, justice,
impel a close inquiry into the constitutional propriety of
Prudhomme's rule. ' 65 In an erudite analysis, he concluded "that
Prudhomme states erroneously Fifth Amendment law and fails
to follow the United States Supreme Court and [the California
Supreme Court's] own previous decisions. '66
Justice Elkington having thus invited the Supreme Court to
reconsider Prudhomme, the People petitioned for a hearing and
requested that it do so. The question presented, therefore, was
whether the Supreme Court should retract the rule announced in
Prudhomme. In March, 1976, the California Supreme Court de-
61. Presiding Justice Molinari was apparently influenced to take this ap-
proach by the following passage in Prudhomme: "Applying the foregoing test to
the discovery order in the instant case, neither the order nor the record below
enables us to say that it clearly appears that disclosure to the prosecution...
cannot possibly tend to incriminate her." 2 Cal. 3d at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal.
Rptr. at 133.
62. Justice Sims' approach finds support in Prudhomme's declaration that a
trial judge may order prosecution discovery if "[U]nder the facts and circum-
stances in the case before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly
tend to incriminate defendant." Id. at 327, 466 P.2d at 678, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
63. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 425, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
64. Id., citing 6 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 665 at 4579 (2nd
ed. 1971).
65. Id. at 426, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
66. Id. at 424, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
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nied a hearing in Craig v. Superior Court.
67
Prudhomme Reconsidered
The inquiry into the propriety of the Prudhomme rule must
necessarily begin with a consideration of the "significant de-
velopments" in the law upon which the court placed such great
emphasis. With the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that those
developments did not proceed in the direction anticipated by the
court.
Less than three months after Prudhomme, the United States
Supreme Court delivered its decision in Williams v. Florida68
upholding Florida's "notice-of-alibi statute" 69 against constitu-
tional attack. That statute requires a defendant who intends to
rely upon an alibi defense to give pretrial notice to the prosecu-
tion, together with the names and addresses of intended alibi
witnesses and information as to the place where he claims to
have been. Thereafter, the prosecution is required to disclose any
witnesses it intends to offer in rebuttal to that defense. The
threatened sanction for failure to comply with the rule is exclu-
sion of such evidence at trial.
In his opinion for the majority in Williams,70 Justice White
stated that "the privilege against self-incrimination is not vio-
lated by a requirement that the defendant give notice of an alibi
defense and disclose his alibi witnesses. ' 71 The rationale under-
lying this decision was remarkably similar to that expressed by
Justice Traynor in Jones v. Superior Court, supra. Observing
that such discovery "is designed to enhance the search for truth
by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity
to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or
innocence," 72 Justice White reminded that "[tihe adversary sys-
tem of trial ... is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an
67. 54 Cal. App. 3d 416, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565, hearing den. C. N. No. 37300 (Ct. of
App., 1st Dist., Div. 1, March 10, 1976).
68. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
69. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200 (West 1975).
70. The Court was divided 6-2 on this issue. Justice Blackmun did not
participate. Interestingly, the two dissenting justices-Black and Douglas-are
no longer members of the Court.
71. 399 U.S. at 83.
72. Id. at 82.
absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. ' 73 In
holding that such prosecution discovery does no offense to fifth
amendment concepts, he stated:
At most, the rule only compelled petitioner to accelerate the timing of
his disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that
the petitioner from the beginning planned to divulge at trial. Nothing in
the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of
constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announc-
ing the nature of his defense, any more than it entitles him to await the
jury's verdict on the State's case- in-chief before deciding whether or
not to take the stand himself.
74
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Williams
had its effect on the only other case viewed by the Prudhomme
court as casting doubt on the constitutionality of alibi statutes:
Cantillon v. Superior Court, supra. In a per curiam decision
dated June 7, 1971, 71 the United States Court of Appeals re-
manded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light
of Williams.76
In addition, Williams effectively disposed of the reliance in
Prudhomme on the "apparent" restrictive federal attitude to-
ward prosecution discovery reflected in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
More significant, however, is the fact that Williams and other
United States Supreme Court decisions since Prudhomme do not
place such "increasing emphasis on the role played by the fifth
amendment" as to militate against prosecution discovery. The
decision in Harris v. New York 77 pointed out the privilege against
self-incrimination is not absolute, but must sometimes give way
to the competing judicial interest in the search for truth. In that
case, a statement taken from a defendant in violation of the rule
announced in Miranda v. Arizona78 was held admissible for the
purpose of impeaching his conflicting testimony at trial. As the
court declared: "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a de-
fense. . . . ,79 This rule has recently been reaffirmed in Oregon v.
Hass.80
73. Id.
74. Id. at 85.
75. Cantillon v. Superior Court, 442 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1971).
76. No new decision has been published. Since the original proceeding was
for habeas corpus relief from a contempt order arising out of discovery non-
compliance, it was probably rendered moot with the passage of time.
77. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
78. Supra n.35.
79. 401 U.S. at 226.
80. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
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In Wardius v. Oregon8 1 the United States Supreme Court did
sustain a constitutional attack on prosecution discovery in a state
proceeding, but it did so on due process, 82 not fifth amendment,
grounds. That decision involved an Oregon notice-of-alibi stat-
ute which, in contrast to the Florida rule, made no provision for
reciprocal discovery by the defense. 83 Noting the fundamental
unfairness of such a procedure, the court held ". . . in the ab-
sence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary,
discovery must be a two-way street.
' 84
The most recent pronouncement by the United States Supreme
Court on the subject of prosecution discovery is found in United
States v. Nobles.85 There, the defendant was charged with bank
robbery. When a defense investigator was called to the stand for
the purpose of impeaching two prosecution witnesses with their
prior inconsistent oral statements, the trial court ordered the
investigator's reports of those statements be disclosed to the
prosecutor. In his opinion for a unanimous court,88 Justice
Powell stated:
... "[T]he privilege [against self-incrimination] is a personal
privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may
incriminate him."
In this instance disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense
investigator's report would not impinge on the fundamental values
protected by the Fifth Amendment. The court's order was limited to
statements allegedly made by third parties who were available as
witnesses to both the prosecution and the defense .... The fact that
these statements of third parties were elicited by a defense investigator
on [defendant's] behalf does not convert them into [defendant's] per-
sonal communications. Requiring their production from the inves-
tigator therefore would not in any sense compel [defendant] to be a
witness against himself or extort communications from him.
We thus conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not
extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as wit-
nesses at trial .... 87
These decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate
81. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
82. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ." U.S. Const., Amend XIV § 2.
83. ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.455 (formerly § 135.875) (1975).
84. 412 U.S. at 475.
85. 422 U.S. 25 (1975).
86. Justice Douglas did not participate.
87. 422 U.S. at 233-34 (footnote omitted).
that Prudhomme is not only without support from, but is also in
conflict with, recent "significant developments" in federal con-
stitutional law. Moreover, as Justice Elkington pointed out in
Craig v. Superior Court, supra, Prudhomme fails to follow pre-
viously-established law.
As long ago as 1948, in People v. Trujillo,88 the California
Supreme Court held the state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is not intended to protect a defendant against
"any and every compulsion," but rather against "testimonial
compulsion".89 Similarly, the federal constitutional privilege has
been held to protect an accused "only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evi-
dence of a testimonial or communicative nature. .."90 Compul-
sion which renders a defendant "the source of 'real or physical
evidence' does not violate" 91 the privilege, however.92 Thus, as the
California Supreme Court stated in People v. Ellis:93
It has been urged that the privilege reflects an ultimate sense of
fairness that prohibits the state from demanding assistance of any
kind from an individual in penal proceedings taken against him. [Fn.
omitted.] The privilege includes no such prohibition."
People v. Schader, supra, upon which the court in Prudhomme
placed substantial reliance, did not change existing law. That
case involved a defendant who testified in his own behalf, and the
issue presented was the permissible scope of his cross-
examination. Preliminary to dealing with that issue, the court in
Schader undertook a general review of pertinent, established
constitutional doctrines. As it correctly stated, the prosecution
must "shoulder the entire load" of its burden of proof "without
assistance either from the defendant's silence or from his com-
88. 32 Cal. 2d 105, 194 P.2d 681 (1948).
89. Id. at 112, 194 P.2d at 685. Quoting 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2263, at 379
(1961).
90. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 764.
92. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (appearance in line-up; utterance of words used in the crime);
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (wearing particular clothing); People v.
Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529,421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966) (uttering words for voice
identification); People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223,384 P.2d 16,32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963)
(assuming particular pose for identification purposes); People v. Duroncelay, 48
Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957) (blood sample); People v. Zavala, 239 Cal. App. 2d
732, 49 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1966) (nalline test for narcotics addiction); People v. Smith,
113 Cal. App. 2d 416, 248 P.2d 444 (1952) (handwriting exemplars); People v. One
1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168 P.2d 443 (1946) (physical examina-
tion). But cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885), which held that an accused
may not be compelled to produce private papers in his possession.
93. 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966).
94. Id. at 534-35, 421 P.2d at 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (emphasis added).
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pelled testimony." (Emphasis added.) The Schader court did not
purport to express a constitutional "policy" against any com-
pelled disclosures by a defendant, for such a sweeping statement
would have been beyond the scope of its decision and contrary to
its own previous pronouncements. In Prudhomme, however, the
court assigned significance to certain phrases taken out of con-
text from Schader, and used them to extend the scope of the
privilege beyond "testimonial or communicative" compulsion.
The result was a rule which is unsupported by and indeed is
contrary to legal precedent.
Applied literally, the Prudhomme rule would operate to afford
a defendant protections that the Supreme Court could not have
intended. For example, it would prohibit a court from compel-
ling him to give handwriting, voice or fingerprint exemplars95 for
identification purposes, since they are clearly capable of incrimi-
nation. Similarly, a logical extension of the protection an-
nounced in Prudhomme would result in a requirement that the
police obtain a fifth amendment waiver from an arrestee before
seizing evidence or conducting a line-up.9 6 The absurdity of these
propositions simply points out that the Supreme Court has not
only stretched the privilege against self-incrimination beyond its
intended limits, but beyond the bounds of reason as well.
The appropriate remedy is not modification or clarification of
Prudhomme. The confusion it has caused among the lower
courts must be attributed not only to its overbreadth, but also to
the fact that it cannot be reconciled with time-honored precepts.
Moreover, the court's reliance on an anticipated trend in federal
decisions has proved to have been misplaced. Rather than sup-
porting Prudhomme, the "significant developments" in fifth
amendment interpretation instead confirm that Jones reflects
the correct application of the law to the area of criminal discov-
ery. Additionally, Prudhomme conflicts with the very policy the
court has relied upon in extending discovery rights to
defendants:
but hindered by the concealment of relevant and material evidence.
Although our system of administering criminal justice is adversary in
nature, a trial is not a game. Its ultimate goal is the ascertainment of
truth, and where furtherance of the adversary system comes in conflict
95. See cases cited note 92 supra.
96. Id.
with the ultimate goal, the adversary system must give way to reason-
able restraints designed to further that goal.97
Thus, perpetuation of the Prudhomme rule furthers no legiti-
mate interest. As the same court recognized in Radarv. Rogers,98
" 'When the reason of a rule ceases so should the rule itself.'"
Prudhomme should be overruled.
Whether the Supreme Court will do so is an entirely different
question. Recognizing the states retain the power to impose
higher standards than required by the federal Constitution,9 9 it
has shown an increasing proclivity in recent years to rely upon
state constitutional provisions as the basis for its decisions.' ° On
some occasions it has used that authority to avoid the restrictions
of a United States Supreme Court decision with which it did not
agree.101
Recently, in Reynolds v. Superior Court,10 2 the court hinted by
way of dicta that it is seriously considering the state constitution
as an independent basis for the Prudhomme rule. The trial court
in Reynolds had issued an order directing the defendant to give
at least three days' notice before calling any alibi witnesses, and
to disclose the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all
such witnesses. The order also required the prosecution to dis-
close to the defendant any evidence it might obtain which would
tend to impeach those witnesses. The threatened sanction for
noncompliance was exclusion of such evidence at trial.
On review, the Supreme Court noted that California does not
97. Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 622, 522 P.2d 681, 684, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 121,124 (1974); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 531,487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 594, 598 (1971).
98. 49 Cal. 2d 243, 249, 317 P.2d 17, 21(1957); Quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 3510
(West 1970).
99. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
100. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,503 P.2d 921,105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972)
(cruel or unusual punishment); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628,493 P.2d 880, 100
Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (cruel or unusual
punishment-death penalty); People v. Compton, 6 Cal. 3d 55,490 P.2d 537,98 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1971) (double jeopardy); Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707,470 P.2d
345, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (double jeopardy); In re Lopez, 2 Cal. 3d 141,465 P.2d
257, 84 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (right to counsel in misdemeanor cases).
101. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr.,
360 (1976), which relied upon CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15, in declining to follow Harris
v. New York; People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,531 P.2d 1099,119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975), which refused to apply the fourth amendment standards defined in United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
102. 12 Cal. 3d 834,528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974). See also Rodriguez v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 88 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1970), in which a Court of
Appeal had earlier held an order for disclosure of alibi witnesses to be void in the
absence of statutory authorization. But cf. People v. Hall, 7 Cal. App. 3d 562, 86
Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970), which upheld a similar order. Hall was disapproved by the
Supreme Court in Reynolds, however.
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have a statute which establishes such a discovery procedure.
Recognizing that Williams v. Florida, supra, had upheld a
notice-of-alibi statute against fifth amendment attack, it also
observed the potential for due process problems reflected in
Wardius v. Oregon, supra. Since the order "presents delicate and
difficult questions of constitutional law,' 1 0 3 the court concluded
that it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to establish such
a discovery procedure under its inherent power to administer
justice. Rather, it declared that such a rule is better left to the
considered judgment of the Legislature.
In holding the trial court's order was improper, the Supreme
Court carefully avoided passing upon the constitutional ques-
tion. It did, however, undertake a review of the "constitutional
parameters" involved. And, while the court conceded the
Prudhomme rule "was in part based on this court's reading of
pre-Williams federal law,"'10 4 it went on to state:
Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that Prudhomme put this court on
record as being considerably more solicitous of the privilege against
self-incrimination than federal law currently requires. Thus, there is no
foregone answer to the question we would necessarily face were we to
pass on the merits of the superior court's order: whether notice-of-alibi
procedures in general are permissible under the California
Constitution. 105
While the question is still an open one, the very strong possibil-
ity exists that the court will reject the recent expressions of the
United States Supreme Court and decline to overrule Prud-
homme, relying upon the state constitution as the basis for its
decision. But does the California constitution support such a
result or would such result simply represent the personal prefer-
ence of a majority of the court's justices?
The state privilege against self-incrimination, 0 6 while not iden-
103. 12 Cal. 3d at 842, 528 P.2d at 49, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
Noteworthy is the fact the court has never found it inappropriate to establish
and extend the right of a criminal defendant to compel discovery from the
prosecution in the absence of legislative authority. Additionally, the "delicate
and difficult" problems the court found in such an order under Wardius v.
Oregon are actually non-existent in California, since defendants are accorded
extremely liberal discovery rights. The holding in this case thus reflects the same
attitude as its dicta; a reluctance by the court to extend discovery rights to the
prosecution in any form.
104. Id. at 843, 528 P.2d at 50, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
105. Id.
106. "Persons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness
against themselves .... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
tical, is substantially similar to the corresponding federal con-
stitutional guarantee. 10 7 Since the California constitution was
adopted after the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights,10 8 the
similarity of these guarantees presents a strong indication that
the former was patterned after the latter. Of course, this is not to
say the state constitution must conform with federal constitu-
tional interpretation. California's Article I, section 24 declares:
"Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." However, it
does appear to have been the intent of the people of California in
adopting the privilege that the standards which define the feder-
al right be persuasive factors in its interpretation. Support for
this observation lies in the fact the California guarantee was
adopted in 1849 to provide individuals the same protection
against the state that they enjoyed against the federal govern-
ment, because the fifth amendment was not then binding upon
the states. 0 9 Additionally, the California framers' respect for the
federal provisions is reflected in the state Constitution itself:
"[T]he United States Constitution is the supreme law of the
land." 1 0 Indeed, the California Supreme Court recognized the
persuasiveness of federal constitutional interpretation in Gab-
rielli v. Knickerbocker:"'
State courts in interpreting provisions of the state Constitution are
not necessarily concluded by an interpretation placed on similar provi-
sions in the federal Constitution. [Citations]. But these decisions de-
clare that cogent reasons must exist before a state court in construing a
provision of the state Constitution will depart from the construction
placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provi-
sion in the federal Constitution.
The court's increasingly frequent departures from this stand-
ard have been severely criticized by its dissenting judges. The
most recent-and perhaps most convincing-criticism was
voiced by Justice Richardson in People v. Disbrow."2 In that
case the court rejected the rule of Harris v. New York, supra, on
state constitutional grounds. Richardson stated:
107. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend V.
108. Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution was adopted on
November 5, 1974. The self-incrimination privilege was formerly embodied in
article I, section 13. That section provided: "No person shall ... be compelled, in
any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. ... The change in phraseol-
ogy in no way suggests an intent to change the meaning. Rather, a review of the
present and former provisions of article I's Declaration of Rights reveals a
wholesale change designed to delete all exclusively-male references therein, as a
result of recent social movements.
109. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
110. CAL. CONST. art. III § 1.
111. 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89, 82 P.2d 391, 392-93 (citation omitted) (1938).
112. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
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In my view, in the absence of very strong countervailing circum-
stances we should defer to the leadership of the nation's highest court
in its interpretation of nearly identical constitutional language, rather
than attempt to create a separate echelon of state constitutional in-
terpretations to which we will advert whenever a majority of this court
differ from a particular high court interpretation. The reason for the
foregoing principle is that it promotes uniformity and harmony in an
area of the law which peculiarly and uniquely requires them. The
alternative required by the majority must inevitably lead to the growth
of a shadow tier of dual constitutional interpretations state by state
which, with temporal variances, will add complexity to an already
complicated body of law.
The vagaries and uncertainties of constitutional interpretations, par-
ticularly in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment sectors of our criminal
law, are the hard facts of life with which the general public, the courts,
and law enforcement officials must grapple daily. This condition
necessarily breeds uncertainty, confusion, and doubt. It will not be
eased or allayed by a proliferation of multiple judicial interpretations
of nearly identical language.
113
Justice Richardson's argument is particularly compelling,
when applied to the question of discovery by the prosecution in a
criminal case. The state privilege against self-incrimination has
already been interpreted in Jones v. Superior Court, supra, as
presenting no bar to disclosure of evidence a defendant intends
to introduce at trial. The corresponding federal guarantee has
received the same interpretation by the United States Supreme
Court upon the same rationale. No interest peculiar to California
calls for a contrary reading of the state constitution. Perpetua-
tion of the Prudhomme rule therefore necessitates a rejection of
both state and federal persuasive authority based solely on "the
personal whims of the Court's membership.""' 4 Additionally,
continuing conflict between Prudhomme and the Williams-
Nobles line of federal decisions serves only to compound the
confusion over the permissible extent of a valuable aid in the
search for truth. Since California's Declaration of Rights "may
not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people,"' 1 5 the unwarranted perpetuation of the Prudhomme
rule will tend to defeat not only the state's right to a fair trial, but
justice itself.
113. Id. at 119, 545 P.2d at 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
114. Kurland, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. at-265-66.
115. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.

